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CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN DIFFERENT 
NATIONAL CONTEXTS: THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 
 
Abstract 
The influence of different national contexts on corporate environmental disclosure practices, 
including the effects of cultural environments, has yet to be properly addressed in the literature. 
The purpose of this research is, therefore, to analyse how cultural factors affect the 
environmental disclosure practices of companies in different countries. This research is 
supported by the diversity of cultures across countries. Given that a cultural framework prompts 
different organisational actions and strategies, the question to be answered through this research 
is as follows: How do cultural aspects impact corporate environmental disclosure? Cultural 
factors are precisely the ones that can explain similarities and differences between stakeholders’ 
actions and preferences. The sample used in this research comprises companies in 28 countries 
and nine economic sectors for the period 2004 to 2015. Our main findings show that companies 
operating in countries with individualist, masculine and indulgent cultures are less likely to 
disclose environmental information. Contrary to our predictions, cultures with a long-term 
orientation also discourage the reporting of environmental information, while uncertainty 
avoidance contexts tend to promote more environmental reporting. 
 
Keywords: Environmental disclosure practices, cultural dimensions, national culture, 
international companies 
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CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN DIFFERENT 
NATIONAL CONTEXTS: THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 
 
1. Introduction  
Environmental disclosure is affected by various aspects of both an internal and an 
external nature. Other factors may also lead to differences in corporate environmental 
information disclosure, and these can be attributed to the diversity of cultures across countries. 
Differences in national culture have very important implications for ethics, corporate social 
responsibility, organisational culture, and managerial practices. Being successful in today’s 
complex and turbulent environments, nowadays business organisations are expected to practice 
ethics and corporate social responsibility in order to gain social legitimacy. These two 
expectations are more complex than profit maximisation and are highly culturally driven. Given 
that a cultural framework prompts different organisational actions and strategies (Scott, 2008), 
the question to be answered through this research is as follows: How do cultural aspects impact 
corporate environmental disclosure? Cultural factors are precisely the ones that can explain 
similarities and differences between stakeholders’ actions and preferences (Tsakumis, 2007). 
Indeed, cultural differences across countries have a significant impact on the way companies 
behave (Williamson, 2000) such that “culture on corporate sustainability or environmental 
practices may vary depending on the level of analysis at which those practices are considered, 
underlining the importance of conceptualizations of culture at levels of analysis other than 
country” (Miska, Szőcs, & Schiffinger, 2018, p. 265). 
Environmental issues are now one of the biggest concerns for companies and society in 
general. Many companies have been criticised for their negative impact on the environment, 
rather than for their technological or economic performance, and it is therefore logical that 
companies are interested in showing society that they are also concerned about the welfare of 
the environment; to do so, they resort to the disclosure of environmental information, both 
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qualitative and quantitative, which will allow the environmental impact of a company’s 
activities to be measured, calculated or estimated (Craig & Diga, 1998; Burritt, 2002; Cho & 
Patten, 2007; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009). At the same time, stakeholders are increasingly putting 
pressure on companies to introduce major environmental responsibility measures, such as 
publishing environmental reports and thereby disclosing aspects related to their public image, 
activities and aspirations associated with the environment (Choi, 1999; Berthelot, Cormier, & 
Magnan, 2003; Kolk, 2003). 
In recent years, empirical studies have increasingly focused on environmental matters 
(Shi, 2004). Many involved analysis of various factors affecting corporate environmental 
disclosure. Bewley and Li (2000), for example, have reached the conclusion that companies 
with greater coverage in the media and more political exposure disclose more information on 
environmental matters. Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) have focused on companies in China to 
analyse different factors that affect environmental reporting, concluding that firm size is one of 
the variables with the greatest impact. Sun, Salama, Hussainey, and Habbash (2010) have 
analysed the relationship between corporate environmental disclosure and earnings 
management, and the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on that relationship. Their 
study focuses on UK companies, and their findings do not record any statistically significant 
relationship between the different measures of discretionary accrual regarding earnings 
management and environmental disclosure. Other studies have addressed the relationship 
between environmental disclosure and environmental performance (e.g., Clarkson, Richardson, 
& Vasvari, 2007; Cho, Roberts, & Patten, 2010; Iatridis, 2013). Many of these studies report a 
positive relationship between performance and corporate environmental disclosure.  
In view of the above ideas, our research purpose is to shed more light on the impact that 
different cultures have on these disclosure practices (Scott, 2001). To do so, we follow the 
dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1983), Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), and Hofstede, 
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Hofstede and Minkov (2010): power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty 
avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence. These cultural dimensions have been tested 
in previous studies in the field of corporate social responsibility (Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, 
& Tondkar, 2005; Orij, 2010), and to a lesser extent in the environmental field.  
In general, our main findings show that certain cultural dimensions, such as 
individualism, masculinity and indulgence, have a negative effect on environmental 
information disclosure. In contrast, power distance does not impact on environmental reporting, 
while uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation affect positive and negatively the 
disclosure of environmental issues, respectively, contrary to our expectations in both cases.  
Our findings also contribute to the debate on environmental disclosure in several ways. 
First, the effect that cultural contexts have on environmental disclosure is analysed, building on 
previous research studies (Kolk & Perego, 2010; Once & Almagtome, 2014; De Villiers & 
Marques, 2016; Semenova & Hassel, 2016). The study delves into the type of information 
international companies disclose about their environmental practices by considering 53 items 
on three related matters: innovation, resource use and emissions. Second, cultural contexts are 
proxied by using the Hofstede’s culture dimensions in line with most of earlier research on 
culture, which was dominated by the use of Hofstede's culture dimensions. These culture 
dimensions are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty 
avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence. Third, our evidence shows that the power 
distance dimension does not affect environmental reporting, in comparison to past research, 
which supports a negative association between them. Furthermore, our findings also 
demonstrate that uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation have a positive and negative 
effect on the disclosure of environmental information, respectively, which is also contrary to 
most of earlier research on this issue. Thus, our evidence on the power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance and long-term orientation dimensions contributes to existing theory on culture and 
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environmental practice in organizations. Specially, the discouragement of environmental 
reporting in long-term orientation cultures is the most important novelty of this research 
because it counters to what prior research on managers’temporal orientation would say. Finally, 
based on the results obtained, it is evident that the cultural context in which companies operate 
is influential and that environmental reporting is determined by cultural pressures, as suggested 
by scholars such as Aerts, Cormier, and Magnan (2006).  
The paper is structured as follows: the theoretical framework is explained in the next 
section. The hypotheses are presented in section three. Section four provides the methodology 
and the variables used. The results are analysed in section five and, finally, the conclusions and 
our findings’ implications are presented in section six. 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
National culture and environmental disclosure 
In recent years, a growing number of organisations have sought to modify their 
environmental practices so as to reduce their environmental impacts and improve their 
corporate image (Monteiro & Aibar-Guzmán, 2010; Barnett, Darnall, & Husted, 2015). 
Meanwhile, companies have also begun disclosing corporate environmental information to 
avoid potential conflicts with their stakeholders (Epstein & Roy, 2001). 
Scholars such as Cerin (2002), Berthelot, Cormier, and Magnan (2003), Moneva and 
Ortas (2010), and Higgins and Larrinaga (2014) contend that stakeholders require organisations 
to act in an eco-friendly way, and so many companies throughout the world have now increased 
the level and scope of their environmental information disclosure as a value-added tool 
(Gamble, Hsu, Kite, & Radtke, 1995). There seems to be no single explanation for why 
companies issue this type of information. Several reasons may be considered to explain why 
organisations report on environmental issues. Scholars such as Deegan and Samkin (2006) 
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consider that an initial reason may be that companies wish to show how responsible they are 
towards a wide range of stakeholders. Through environmental disclosure, companies respond 
to stakeholders’ expectations, and in so doing contribute to the welfare of society 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000). Other researchers (Balmer & Greyser, 2007; Vanhamme & Grobben, 
2009) have argued that the disclosure of environmental information is used primarily to protect 
a company’s reputation and identity by engaging with stakeholders through what some have 
described as a form of moral discourse (Reynolds & Yuthas, 2008). Another reason for 
reporting on environmental issues is that companies expect some reward in terms of long-term 
profitability that may improve their ability to attract labour, reassuring shareholders about non-
financial risk, reducing information asymmetries (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007) and 
improving stakeholder decision-making (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010). 
Others argue that companies report on environmental aspects because they are forced to 
do so by various cultural pressures, as they operate within contexts formed by national cultures 
that affect their behaviour and impose certain expectations on them (Collier, 2001; Modell, 
2002; Campbell, 2007). This contextual relationship means that companies operating in 
countries with similar cultural dimensions will adopt similar behaviours. In this context, 
organisations operating in similar environments tend to adopt the same strategic behaviour, and 
it thus focuses on the deeper aspects of social structures (Claessens & Fan, 2002).  
According to Scott (2008), a cultural system can be considered an example of social 
structure because it introduces a dimension of social life that is prescriptive, evaluative and 
obligatory. According to Tsakumis (2007), cultural systems explain the similarities and 
differences of how the human mind is programmed, which in turn differentiates societies around 
the world. Thus, organisations are influenced by cultural aspects. Roy and Goll (2014) consider 
that culture guides the behavior of members of a society by providing logical behaviour. For 
Caprar, Devinney, Kirkman, and Caligiuri (2015), culture is discussed as a set of shared 
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characteristics reflected in the behavior of individuals within a specific group. In this regard, 
Hofstede (1980) is representative of these approaches. 
Moreover, Su (2006) reveals that culture has an important impact on corporate decision-
making processes and influences companies’ structures, managers and behaviour. Companies 
operating in different cultural systems are forced to adopt a sustainable behaviour that will 
mould their standards of transparency and environmental practices (Richardson & Boyd, 2005). 
It is therefore important to define what we consider a culture to be and how it affects 
corporate decisions in matters of environmental disclosure. According to Vitell, Paolillo, and 
Thomas (2003), a culture may be defined as a collective programming of the mind that is almost 
invisible and unconscious and difficult to change, affecting people’s basic values and corporate 
values at the same time. In this regard, Parboteeah and Cullen (2003, p. 138) consider a culture 
to be a historically determined set of implicit and explicit abstract notions and beliefs (i.e., what 
is good, proper and desirable), shared by a group of individuals with a common historical 
experience. These cultural values, standards, beliefs and assumptions are symbolically 
reinforced and passed down from one generation to another through socialisation and education. 
According to other scholars, such as Su (2006) and Tsakumis (2007), a national culture has a 
significant impact on the ethics of decision-making processes, and is expected to have an 
influence on organisational structure, managers’ behaviour and business performance, as it will 
generate an orientation towards more or less sustainable business operations (Richardson & 
Boyd, 2005), and will help to determine the level of transparency that companies manifest in 
relation to their environmental actions. 
Several studies have analysed the impact that the cultural context has on aspects such as 
accounting practices (Gray, 1988) or the disclosure of several kinds of corporate information 
(Adams & Kuasirikun, 2000). Gray (1988) argues that cultural values have a significant impact 
on national accounting standards and frameworks, as well as on company reports. In turn, 
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Adams and Kuasirikun (2000) report that cultural contexts also play a major role in the way 
companies report other kinds of corporate information, such as that of an environmental nature. 
This may be because cultural aspects are significant when assessing the importance of 
environmental issues, as generally speaking, stakeholders in different countries have varying 
expectations regarding corporate decisions due to their differing cultural conditions that inform 
different personal values, standards and practices (Carroll, 1979). 
The research conducted by Hoffman (1999) also focuses on cultural dimensions, and 
specifically builds a framework for understanding the coherence of organisational fields and 
cultural contexts in environmental matters for companies operating in the US chemical industry. 
According to Hoffman (1999), as cultures evolve, links are forged between their regulatory and 
cognitive aspects that may reveal the influence of cultural aspects within the environmental 
setting of the different organisations. 
Considering companies in Canada and the US, Buhr and Freedman (2001) explore the 
role cultural factors play in environmental disclosure. They contend that Canadian culture is 
more propitious for corporate environmental disclosure than US culture because Canadian 
society has a more collectivist nature that induces companies to report this kind of information. 
Roy and Goll (2014) examine the influence of national culture on various facets of a 
country’s sustainability indicators – namely, environmental aspects. Environmental aspects 
refer to the protection of nature. Data from 57 countries were used in the analyses, with 
countries from all over the world, various forms of government, and all population sizes. They 
include Africa (seven countries), Asia (14 countries), Australasia (two countries), North 
America (six countries), South America (six countries), and Europe (21 countries). The results 
obtained support the basic argument that cultural practices influence environmental behaviours.  
A culture’s impact tends to be analysed through the dimensions proposed by Hofstede 
(1980, 2001), Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) and Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010). 
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Although the model initially considered four cultural dimensions (i.e., power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity), two more were subsequently included 
(i.e., long-term orientation and indulgence), thereby totalling six dimensions. These dimensions 
provide a major framework not only for analysing a national culture, but also for considering 
the effect cultural differences have on management and organisation. According to Hoecklin 
(1996), this theoretical framework is especially useful for shedding light on people’s 
understanding of an organisation, the mechanisms deemed appropriate for controlling and 
coordinating operations within it, and its members’ roles and relationships. According to 
Beugelsdijk, Maseland, and van Hoorn (2015), Hofstede's framework predominates in the 
analysis of national cultures in international business and management, and represents a 
relevant source for the investigation of national culture issues. In terms of culture’s 
conceptualizations, most studies have used the Hostfede’s dimensions in their research (e.g., 
Haxhi & van Ees, 2010; Ho, Wang, & Vitell, 2012; Husted, 2005). 
Hofstede develops this working framework through a sample of IBM employees. The 
data involve answers to questions on their values and perceptions regarding their employment 
situation. Some of these questions are related to personal time, physical conditions, employment 
security, freedom, cooperation, use of skills, and training. In broader terms, according to 
Hofstede (1980), they may be stated as follows: Do you have enough time for your personal or 
family life? Do you have good physical conditions, such as an adequate workspace, good 
ventilation, etc.? Do you have job security? Do you have the necessary freedom to adopt your 
own approach to the job? Do you have the training opportunities to improve your skills and 
knowledge, or learn new skills and knowledge? In total, Hofstede (1980) compiled the answers 
from 32 value statements provided by over 117,000 IBM employees in 40 countries, noting 
approximately 90 significant and independent correlations of variables or indicators with the 
first four dimensions for further validation of the results. Hofstede (1983) replicated and 
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extended the study to include a total of 50 countries, encountering the same dimensions. 
Subsequent studies have provided the scores on the dimensions from 76 countries, partly based 
on replications and extensions of the IBM study on different international populations and by 
different scholars (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hofstede’s cultural model (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede 
& Hofstede, 2005; Hofstede et al., 2010) has been widely applied in prior academic research in 
different fields such as accounting, administration, economics and sociology. We are applying 
this cultural model here to the subject of environmental disclosure, a field that has received less 
attention in prior research (Roy & Goll, 2014).  
This research, therefore, aims to verify how corporate environmental disclosure 
responds to different cultural systems. The culture contexts are proxied by using the six 
Hofstede’s culture dimensions consistent with past investigations, which have also employed 
them (Caprar, Devinney, Kirkman, & Caligiuri, 2015). 
 
3. Research hypotheses  
Organisations are influenced by cultural aspects that reflect the way in which 
organisations conform to the norms, values and cultures that distinguish one society from 
another throughout the world (Tsakumis, 2007). Hence, culture guides the behaviour of the 
members of society by providing a dominant logic (Roy & Goll, 2014). Hofstede (2001) 
considers culture to be a “collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members 
of one group or category of people from another” (p. 10). 
Several models have been developed to understand cultural differences, such as those 
by Schwartz, GLOBE, and Hofstede. The last one is the most widely used in the literature on 
different business topics such as accounting, business, management, and economics (De Mooij 
& Hofstede, 2010). In addition, Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions has also been used in 
various studies of macro-cultural contexts related to issues of social responsibility and business 
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ethics (Ringov & Zollo, 2007; Williams & Zinkin, 2008; García-Sánchez, Rodríguez-Ariza, & 
Frías-Aceituno, 2013), although macro-cultural contexts in the environmental field have been 
less studied. 
Currently, there are six cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1983; Hofstede & Hofstede, 
2005; Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010): power distance, individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence. These dimensions refer to 
different aspects ranging from the acceptance of women’s role and one’s idea of society to the 
assignment of values orientated to the past, present or future. 
Several research studies have analysed how different cultural systems influence the field 
of corporate social responsibility. Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, and Tondkar (2005) have 
conducted their study on US and Scandinavian companies using three of Hofstede’s six cultural 
dimensions. The authors conclude that companies in Scandinavian countries have a greater 
commitment to social and environmental practices than their US counterparts. Orij (2010) has 
also focused on companies belonging to different countries, analysing the relationship between 
corporate social disclosure and national culture. Other studies, such as those conducted by 
Vachon (2010) and Husted (2005), have analysed the impact of national cultures on corporate 
social disclosure, reporting contradictory findings attributable to different cultural 
environments.  
In the environmental field, Fekrat, Inclan, and Petroni (1996) conducted their research 
on a sample of 168 companies operating in 18 countries with different cultural systems. Their 
research reveals differences in the environmental information disclosed by these companies. 
Gamble, Hsu, and Tollerson (1996) also found significant differences in environmental 
practices for a sample of 276 companies in 27 countries. Once and Almagtome (2014) analysed 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions for companies from 20 countries, finding that some of the 
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dimensions, such as individualism and long-term orientation, are related to more corporate 
environmental disclosure, while a high degree of power distance is related to less disclosure. 
Considering the above, research hypotheses are formulated for each of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions to analyse the behaviour of environmental disclosure in different cultural 
contexts. 
3.1. Power distance 
One of the cultural dimensions established by Hofstede (2001) describes the level of 
hierarchy in a society, known as power distance. This dimension represents the extent to which 
members of organisations within a given culture expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally. Inequality might appear in what each individual brings to society and what they 
receive from it, in the distribution of power, or in each individual’s rights and obligations. 
According to Waldman, de Luque, Washburn, and House (2006), cultures with greater power 
distance accept that the hierarchy between superiors and subordinates is extensive and 
legitimate. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) consider that when there is a great power distance, 
positions are placed vertically, giving rise to different levels of power; individuals with less 
power have less interest in social rights. Accordingly, Miska, Szöcs, and Schiffinger (2018) 
contend that people in cultures with a great power distance tend to group themselves into 
different classes depending on a range of criteria. Power bases tend to be stable, and the belief 
is that power ensures social order, relational harmony and stability. In such cultures, only a few 
people have access to resources, capabilities and skills. This means the practices of power 
distance correlate negatively with economic prosperity, competitiveness and human 
development. 
Regarding social and environmental disclosure by organisations, Veser (2004) has 
found that when power distance is high, stakeholders consider it less likely they will receive a 
large amount of information on corporate social and environmental practices. However, when 
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there is a lower power distance, organisations need to disclose more information about these 
practices to gain stakeholder benefits/approval. Similarly, Gray (1988) considers that the 
greater the power distance, the less information is disclosed, because power inequalities are 
preserved and stakeholders are less likely to have higher expectations of social and 
environmental disclosure, as they comply with their home culture and believe that power should 
be concentrated in the hands of only a few. 
Previous studies on power distance and corporate social and environmental disclosure 
have not obtained unanimous results (Miska, Szöcs, & Schiffinger, 2018). In this respect, Ho, 
Wang, and Vitell (2012) and Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), for example, have shown that 
greater power distance increases the disclosure of environmental information, while Orij (2010) 
and Peng, Dashdeleg, and Chih (2014) have found a negative relationship between power 
distance and corporate environmental practices. These results are in line with those indicated 
by Vachon (2010), who considers that companies in countries with less power distance will be 
less concerned about relations with shareholders and will feel more responsible for the welfare 
of the community at large and for publicising their environmental practices. To analyse this 
relationship, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: The higher the power distance in a society is, the lower or weaker environmental 
disclosure will be. 
3.2. Individualism 
Another dimension established by Hofstede (2001) is individualism. In this type of 
society, people feel comfortable when they are empowered to make a decision based on what 
the individual thinks is best, and the freedom and independence of the individual is considered 
of great importance, with priority being given to personal interests over the social group. 
Furthermore, in these types of societies, systems protecting an individual’s rights are highly 
developed, and stakeholders are less interested in achieving objectives that are not their own. 
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As a result, companies in a cultural environment of an individualistic nature will be less willing 
to disclose social and environmental information. 
In contrast, collectivist societies are formed by individuals who think more as members 
of a group than as individuals, and therefore have stronger links to society (Hofstede & 
Hofstede, 2005). In short, these societies have close ties between individuals, extended families 
and groups, whereby everyone accepts responsibility for the members of their group (Peng & 
Lin, 2009). In these types of societies, the group is considered more important than the 
individual, and the values that predominate are cohesion and consensus, while personal, private 
initiatives are secondary (Scholtens & Dam, 2007). Greater emphasis is therefore placed on the 
impact of organisations on society, and collectivist societies tend to be more sensitive to the 
interests of stakeholders (Ho, Wang, & Vitell, 2012; Blodgett, Lu, Rose, & Vitell, 2001). 
Previous studies, such as those conducted by García-Sánchez, Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 
and Frias-Aceituno (2016), show that organisations belonging to countries where a collectivist 
culture prevails tend to have greater incentives to disclose social and environmental information 
to their stakeholders to favour their decision-making processes. Thus, considering the above 
arguments and the previous evidence, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H2: The more individualistic a society is, the lower or weaker its corporate 
environmental disclosure will be. 
3.3. Masculinity 
The masculinity dimension refers to gender and the role of women in society. Male-
orientated cultures tend to be more assertive and focused on material success, while those with 
a female orientation tend to be more cooperative, modest and focused on quality of life. 
Societies that consider themselves masculine describe men as assertive, aggressive, ambitious, 
competitive and materialistic, while co-operative behaviour is less appreciated. 
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In some societies, the social roles of men and women overlap, with neither sex behaving 
competitively, while other societies are considered to have a female orientation. Hofstede 
(1980) considers that female-orientated cultures reveal a preference for co-operation, 
constraint, care for the weak, and quality of life. In general, organisations with a feminine 
culture are not as competitive as those with a masculine one, as the former give more priority 
to concern for others and little distinction is made between men and women in the same position 
(Hofstede, 2001). According to Orij (2010), masculinity is the opposite of a culture’s social 
orientation, whereby less masculine societies have a greater orientation towards stakeholders 
(Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, Tondkar, & Andrews, 2005). 
Scholars such as Peng, Dashdeleg, and Chih (2014) observe that cultures with a high 
degree of masculinity place more importance on values such as professional career and business 
success. In contrast, people in cultures where masculinity is not so important give greater value 
to the group and society (Gray, 1988), while stakeholders seek information about corporate 
decisions, such as those related to preservation of the environment and community 
development. 
Regarding the results obtained in previous research, there seems to be a negative 
relationship between masculinity and corporate social and environmental practices (Husted, 
2005; Orij, 2010). Other researchers have also found a negative relationship between 
masculinity and environmental sustainability, noting that the greater the degree of femininity 
of a given culture, the greater the degree of sustainability, environmental management, and 
commitment to sustainable development (Peng & Lin, 2009; Roy & Goll, 2014). Therefore, 
based on the previous arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H3: The more masculine a society is, the lower or weaker its corporate environmental 
disclosure will be. 
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3.4. Uncertainty avoidance 
This dimension measures how members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain, 
unknown or unstructured situations, and represents the level of aversion to the unknown. 
According to Sully de Luque and Javidan (2004, p. 602), uncertainty avoidance is “the extent 
to which ambiguous situations are threatening to individuals, to which rules and order are 
preferred, and to which uncertainty is tolerated in a society”. Societies with high uncertainty 
avoidance impose more rules and regulations on people, with less tolerance for change and 
innovation (De Mooij & Hofstede, 2010). In this case, business practices related to the 
environment will be promoted through the issue of regulations, which will prompt organisations 
to develop more rigid and standardised actions. 
In contrast, societies with low uncertainty avoidance are more receptive to change and 
have more flexible rules and laws, and thus stakeholders in these types of societies have higher 
expectations concerning social and environmental habits and require more information on 
environmental issues and sustainability in general. This opinion is shared by Adelopo, Cea 
Moure, and Obalola (2013), who posit that companies from countries with less tolerance to 
uncertainty disclose more environmental information to reduce uncertainty. 
Regarding the sign of the relationship, the various scholars do not agree, reporting mixed 
results. Scholars such as Vachon (2010) find a negative relationship between uncertainty 
avoidance, green corporatism, and environmental innovation, while other researchers such as 
Husted (2005), Orij (2010), and Thanetsunthorn (2015) have not found a positive or negative 
determinant of the impact of uncertainty avoidance on environmental and social disclosure. 
Considering the previous arguments, the hypothesis is as follows:  
H4: The higher the uncertainty avoidance in a society is, the lower or weaker its 
corporate environmental disclosure will be. 
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3.5. Long-term orientation 
This dimension suggests that a society attaches considerable importance to future events 
and occurrences, whereas a cultural dimension with a short-term orientation implies that a 
society gives more importance to the past and the present than to the future. Furthermore, 
individuals in these kinds of society believe that the truth depends heavily on the situation, 
context and time, and they have a major propensity to save and invest, being known for their 
astuteness and perseverance (Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). 
Cultures with a long-term orientation are willing to look to the future, and socially 
responsible investments in companies can lead to sustainable and long-term competitiveness 
and prosperity. Stakeholders view these cultures as less likely to consider corporate social and 
environmental investments as an agency cost and a waste of shareholders’ resources (Cheng, 
Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). In fact, stakeholders in this type of culture give more importance 
to reports on social and environmental aspects than to traditional financial reports, as they 
provide important information about the future. Conversely, in cultures with a short-term 
orientation, it may be difficult to justify the value of corporate social and environmental 
investments because their payoffs take time to materialise. 
Cultures with a long-term orientation are associated with a social approach, and 
corporate social and environmental practices are expected to be positively related. Scholars 
such as Hackert, Krymwiede, Tokle, and Vokurka (2012) have found that investments for 
preventing pollution and investments in recycling and waste reduction are carried out primarily 
by organisations operating in this type of culture. This consideration is consistent with the 
notion that societies with a long-term cultural dimension are more committed to the 
preservation of the environment and related sustainability issues. Considering all of the above, 
the following hypothesis is presented: 
18 
H5: The greater the long-term orientation in a society is, the higher or stronger its 
corporate environmental disclosure will be. 
 
3.6. Indulgence 
This dimension is the latest addition to Hofstede’s cultural framework (Hofstede, 
Hofstede, & Minkov 2010) and is related to gratification versus the control of basic human 
desires connected with well-being. Indulgent societies are more permissive in relation to the 
natural human desire of health and well-being, while control societies are more likely to believe 
that such gratification should be controlled and regulated by strict norms. It is not therefore 
considered likely that indulgent societies will sacrifice well-being in favour of the environment. 
Societies of this kind have some main features, including a perception of personal life control, 
greater importance of leisure, freedom of speech, and a higher percentage of people declaring 
themselves to be very happy, while maintaining public order is not given a high priority, among 
other aspects. 
As Ismail and Lu (2014, p. 45) observe, “people in indulgence societies prefer happiness 
and tend to create a perception of freedom, health, and control over life. Its opposite pole, 
restraint culture, refers to a society which controls the gratification of the above mentioned 
desires and feelings.” 
This cultural dimension therefore concerns the degree to which people seek to regulate 
their desires and impulses, according to the way they are proposed. Relatively strong control is 
called restriction, while relatively weak control is called indulgence. Given these definitions, 
we may posit that restriction cultures will have organisations with more incentives to carry out 
activities related to the environment, and then make them known to stakeholders. Considering 
the previous arguments, we propose the following working hypothesis: 
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H6: The more indulgent a society is, the lower or weaker its corporate environmental 
disclosure will be. 
4. Methodology, sample and variables 
4.1. Sample 
Our initial sample consisted of 13,178 international firm-year observations from 2004 
to 2015. Financial entities were excluded because these companies comply with different rules 
from non-financial firms and, therefore, financial statements of these two types of firms are not 
comparable. From this initial sample, 419 firms were also removed because the data of some 
of the variables were missing. Thus, the final panel data sample is unbalanced and consists of 
12,759 firm-year observations pertaining to 28 countries, which are provided in Table 1. As can 
be seen, the country with the highest representation is the United States with 28.41%, followed 
by Japan with 14.02% and the United Kingdom with 9.48%. In contrast to these figures, 
Portugal represents 0.23%, and Greece is the country with the lowest percentage at 0.08%. All 
the information was collected from the Thomson Reuters database.  
Insert Table 1 
The international companies of the final sample operate within the nine industries shown 
in Table 2. The sectorial classification used in this research is based on the TRBC economic 
sector classification by Thomson Reuters. The number of companies from each industry is also 
provided in Table 2. The sectors most represented are industrials, consumer cyclical and basic 
metals with 21.91%, 19.23% and 13.74%, respectively, and telecommunications services with 
3.61%, the lowest representation.  
Insert Table 2 
 
 
 
20 
4.2. Variables 
4.2.1. Dependent variable 
 The dependent variable, environmental disclosure, is labelled ENVIR_DISCL. Our 
environmental disclosure proxy, in line with scholars such as Lee, Kim, Lee, and Li (2012) and 
Rupp and Mallory (2015), was measured using a multidimensional construct with the purpose 
of collecting all environmental information reported by the firms of our sample. Thus, our 
environmental reporting index is measured by the ratio between the unweighted aggregation of 
53 items relating to environmental matters presented in Table 3 (e.g., Gallego-Álvarez & Ortas, 
2017) – which will take the value 1 if the company reports the item analysed, and 0 otherwise 
– and the total number of items analysed (53). All the environmental items disclosed by the 
firms of our sample have been collected from the Thomson Reuters database. These items are 
included in the Asset ESG Environmental datatypes section. Three areas were explored to 
construct the environmental reporting index – innovation, resource use and emissions – 
consistent with Radu and Francoeur (2017) and Wu, Liu, Chin, and Zhu (2018), among others. 
Thus, our environmental reporting index attempts to respond to questions such as: (a) renewable 
energy use: do firms make use of renewable energy? (b) environmental supply chain 
management: do companies use environmental criteria (ISO 14000 or energy consumption, 
among others) in the selection process of their suppliers or sourcing partners? (c) emission 
reduction policy: do firms have a policy to reduce emissions? (d) waste reduction total: do 
companies report on initiatives to recycle, reduce, reuse, substitute, treat or phase out total 
waste, hazardous waste or wastewater? (e) environmental products: do firms report on at least 
one product line or service that is designed to have positive effects on the environment or which 
is environmentally labelled and marketed? (f) water technologies: do companies develop 
products or technologies that are used for water treatment and purification or that improve water 
use efficiency?  
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Insert Table 3 
4.2.2. Independent variables  
Cultural issues were measured following the national cultural dimension model created 
by Hofstede (1980, 2001), which was enhanced later by Hofstede et al. (2010). Authors such 
as Vachon (2010) and Peng, Dashdeleg, and Chih (2014), Gallego-Álvarez and Ortas (2017) 
and Miska et al. (2018) support the national culture dimension model as the most suitable 
construction for measuring the different cultures among countries. Hofstede’s model takes into 
account six cultural dimensions to capture the cultural differences of several countries: (1) 
power distance, defined as POW_DIST, (2) individualism versus collectivism, defined as 
INDIV, (3) masculinity versus femininity, labelled as MASCUL, (4) uncertainty avoidance, 
labelled as UNC_AVOID, (5) long-term orientation, based on Confucian thinking and defined 
as LONG_ORIENTATION, and (6) indulgence versus restraint, labelled as INDULG.  
The first cultural dimension, power distance, shows the degree to which a society admits 
that there is no equality in the power of organisations. Members in societies with high levels of 
power distance are more likely to pursue formal codes of conduct and are reluctant to go against 
what superiors say. In contrast to this, members in societies with low levels of power distance 
do not perceive great differences in position, status or power, and tend to follow informal codes 
of conduct. According to the Hofstede website, the variable power distance, POW_DIST, 
measures differences between national societies and the position of societies relative to each 
other is expressed in a power distance index score. The values of the power distance index score 
range from 0 to 100. Scores close to 0 stand for a smaller power distance, while scores close to 
100 stand for a larger power distance. Power distance index score will account for high values 
(50-100) in societies with dictatorships or oligarchies, smaller middles class, more income 
inequality or political systems changed by revolution (societies with long power distance), 
among others, while low values (0-49) will be scored in societies with larger middle class, 
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peaceful conflict resolution, political systems changed by evolution or less income inequality 
(societies with less power distance). 
In relation to the second cultural dimension, individualism versus collectivism, 
individualism reflects if people living together are more individualist or, to the contrary, more 
collectivist. Thus, members of individualist societies tend to be independent, look after 
themselves and value the achievement of personal goals rather than group interests, while 
individuals in collectivist cultures are more likely to respect tradition, be interested in all 
relative to the group and to tend to perceive themselves as members of an extended organisation. 
Individualims vs collectivism can only measure in comparison to other societies. The culture 
dimension individualism, INDIV, is expressed in an individualism index score that also ranges 
from 0 to 100. Scores close to 0 stand for the most collectivist, while scores close to 100 stand 
for the most individualist society. The individualism index score will account for low values 
(0-49) in societies with human rights less respected, less press freedom, slower pace of life or 
older husbands and younger wives, showing a more collective society, while societies with 
more press freedom, smaller age differences between spouses, human rights more respected or 
fater pace of life will account for high values (50-100) (a more individualist society). 
The cultural dimension of masculinity versus femininity relates to societies 
predominately having female or male values. In a masculine culture, members tend to value 
personal attainment, money and success, and are more competitive and aggressive in 
comparison to feminine cultures, where members tend to care for others, place greater 
importance on quality of life and are more nurturing, modest and humble. This culture 
dimension, masculinity vs femininity, can also be measured in comparison to other societies. 
The masculinity, MASCUL, is expressed in a masculinity index score that also ranges from 0 
to 100. Scores close to 0 stand for the most feminine, while scores close to 100 stand for the 
most masculine society. The masculinity index score will account for low values (0-49) in 
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societies with fewer people living in poverty, more leisure, longer vacations or both genders 
shop for food (more feminine societies), while societies with women who are food shoppers, 
salary preferred over leisure, more people living in poverty or more functional illiterates will 
account for high values (50-100) (more masculine societies). 
The fourth cultural dimension, uncertainty avoidance, reflects the fact that individuals 
feel themselves threatened or uncomfortable in a context by uncertain circumstances, and as a 
result, these members will try to achieve conformity through contexts and a belief system 
created by them. In societies where uncertainty avoidance is high, members value security, 
place greater emphasis on written rules and consensus and do not tolerate deviations from the 
rule, while societies with low levels of uncertainty avoidance feel a lower need for written 
norms and are tolerant of deviations from the norm. A deeper description of these four culture 
dimensions can be found in the paper by Blodgett, Bakir, and Rose (2008). The uncertainty 
avoidance, UNC_AVOID, also measures differences between national societies and the 
position of societies relative to each other is expressed in an uncertainty avoidance index score 
that ranges from 0 to 100. Scores close to 0 stand for weaker uncertainty avoidance societies, 
while scores close to 100 stand for stronger uncertainty avoidance societies. The uncertainty 
avoidance will account for low values (0-49) in societies with more alcoholism, higher speed 
limits on motorways, fewer nurses per doctor or consumers buy more pure and clean products 
(more uncertainty avoiding societies), while societies with less alcoholism, consumers buy 
more ready-made convenience products or lower speed limits on motorways will account for 
high values (50-100) (more uncertainty accepting societies). 
The fifth cultural dimension, long-term orientation, represents the extent to which a 
society places greater interest on honesty, self-discipline, learning, adaptiveness and 
accountability of its members. In cultures with a long-term orientation, members are instilled 
with the tendency to be prudent and humble and be persistent in the achievement of their goals, 
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and they are not encouraged to be self-assertive. In societies with a short-term orientation, the 
main values are achievement, freedom, and thinking for oneself, and rights and personal needs 
will determine personal loyalties. Hofstede and Minkov (2010) indicate that, “On the long-term 
side, what works is more important than what is right. Matter and spirit are integrated. Good 
and evil depend upon the circumstances. On the short-term side, there is a deep concern with 
righteousness. Matter and spirit are separated, and there exist universal guidelines about what 
is good and evil.” The long-term orientation, LONG_ORIENTATION, also measures 
differences between national societies and the position of societies relative to each other is 
expressed in a long-term orientation index score that ranges from 0 to 100. Scores close to 0 
stand for a shorter-term orientation, while scores close to 100 stand for a longer-term 
orientation. The long-term orientation will account for low values (0-49) in societies with 
secondary school students perform poorly at mathematics, small savings quote, little money for 
investment or companies report quarterly results (a shorter-term oriented society), while 
societies with secondary school students perform well at mathematics, large savings quote, 
funds available for investment or companies seek market share and long-term profits will 
account for high values (50-100) (a longer-term oriented society). 
The sixth and last cultural dimension refers to indulgence versus restraint. Indulgence 
stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives 
related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society that suppresses 
gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms. Indulgent cultures will 
tend to focus more on individual happiness and well-being, leisure time is more important and 
there is greater freedom and personal control. This is in contrast with restrained cultures, where 
positive emotions are less freely expressed and happiness, freedom and leisure are not given 
the same importance. The indulgence versus restraint dimension, INDULG, also measures 
differences between national societies and the position of societies relative to each other is 
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expressed in an indulgence versus restraint index score that ranges from 0 to 100. Scores close 
to 0 stand for a more restrained society, while scores close to 100 stand for a more indulgent 
society. The indulgent dimension will account for low values (0-49) in societies with lower 
crime rates, larger police force, lower approval of foreign music and films or less obesitas, in 
wealthy countries (a more restrained society), while societies with higher crime rates, smaller 
police force, freedom of speech for al lis rated as very importante or more obesitas, in wealthy 
countries, will account for high values (50-100) (a more indulgente society)  
Summarising, the six cultural dimensions range from 0 to 100, with 50 being the halfway 
point. Countries with a score under 50 show a low culture score, while 50 or above is considered 
a high culture score. For instance, for the culture dimension of individualism versus 
collectivism, a score under 50 is categorised as collectivist and above 50 as individualist. 
Therefore, a country with a score of 30 would be collectivist, but less collectivist than another 
country with a score of 10, because this figure is nearer 0. All the values associated with each 
culture dimension are publicly available through the website of Geert Hofstede. Thus, all data 
for measuring Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions for each country have been collected from the 
Hofstede website.1  
 
4.2.3. Control variables 
 Drawing on past evidence, we take into account several factors that may potentially 
affect the environmental disclosure index. The legal system is considered as a control variable 
using two proxies. First, we consider the legal system in which the country operates, labelled 
as CIVIL_LAW. In this regard, this variable is measured as a dummy variable that will take the 
value 1 if the country has civil law, and 0 otherwise. Kolk and Perego (2010) show that firms 
operating in countries with civil law show a greater commitment to disclosure of environmental 
information. Second, we also take into account the efficiency of the judicial system – namely, 
26 
the degree to which the judicial system of a country can guarantee compliance with laws and 
recommendations, in line with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998). 
The efficiency of the judicial system is denoted by EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST and is measured 
from 0 to 10. In this case, 5 will be the halfway point. Thus, if the efficiency of the judicial 
system scores a value of 2, for example, it shows that the level of efficiency of the judicial 
system is low, whereas it will be higher if the score is 9. Authors such as Cressy, Cumming, 
and Mallin (2010, p. 119) indicate that “corporations are more likely to act in environmentally 
responsible ways when there are strong and well-enforced state regulations in place to ensure 
such behaviour”. The effect of those industries with high or low impact on stakeholders is also 
controlled. In this regard, we categorise industries into critical industries – that is, industries 
with direct and strong effects on stakeholders – and less critical industries – namely, industries 
with less impact on stakeholders. This variable is denoted as HIGH_IMPACT_INDUS and is 
calculated as a dummy variable that will take the value 1 if firms operate in high-impact 
industries, and 0 otherwise. We have used Young and Marais (2012), the FTSE4 Good Indexes 
(2015), Semenova and Hassel (2016) and Jaggi, Allini, Macchioni, and Zagaria (2018) to 
classify industries according to their low and high impact on stakeholders, as outlined in Table 
4.  
Insert Table 4 
Firm size is the fourth control variable considered, defined as SIZE and measured as the 
logarithm of total assets of companies. It is expected, consistent with Jaggi et al. (2018), that 
big companies will be more likely to disclose environmental information, given that they are 
more exposed to public scrutiny, and the impact of their activities on the environment will be 
more visible. Return on assets (ROA) is also controlled for and was calculated as the operating 
income before interests and taxes over total assets. In line with past research (e.g., Kim, Park, 
& Wier, 2012), firms with good corporate performance will be more likely to disclose 
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environmental information because it may reduce investors’ fears about a company’s risk. 
Leverage, labelled as LEVERAGE, has also been considered as a control variable. It is 
measured as debt over total assets. Companies with high levels of leverage will be more likely 
to report environmental information since it may allow creditors to assess any risk regarding 
firm performance (Clarkson, Li, & Richardson, 2004; Jaggi et al., 2018).  
Board size has also been taken into account as a control variable. It is defined as B_SIZE 
and is measured as the number of board members. It is expected that the higher the number of 
directors on the board, the higher the disclosure of environmental information, consistent with 
Husted and Milton de Sousa-Filho (2018), because bigger boards will be more likely to provide 
wider perspectives and opinions in the decision-making process, involving more negotiation 
and debate. Board independence (B_INDEP) is also controlled for, and it is measured as the 
ratio between the total number of independent directors on the board and the total number of 
members on the board. We predict a positive association between board independence and 
environmental reporting (e.g., Husted & Milton de Sousa-Filho, 2018). Independent directors 
are non-executive directors and they defend shareholders’ interests, particularly those of 
minority shareholders and stakeholders. Thus, they will support the reporting of environmental 
matters.  
The presence of a CSR committee is also considered as a control variable – labelled as 
CSR_COMMITTEE – and is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm 
has a CSR committee, and 0 otherwise. A positive effect of CSR committees on environmental 
disclosure is expected (Konadu, 2017). Companies that set up CSR committees are signalling 
their interest in stakeholders’ societal demands; hence, firms with these committees will 
promote firm transparency through the disclosure of CSR information such as that referring to 
environmental matters.  
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The regional effect has also been controlled by using five geographic zones: Asia, 
Europe, Latin America, North America and Oceania. These regions are denoted as ASIA, 
EUROPE, LATINAMERICA, NORTHAMERICA and OCEANIA, and they are calculated as 
dummy variables that will take the value 1 if the country of the sample belongs to the region 
explored, and 0 otherwise. OCEANIA will not be included in the regression because it will be 
the reference category. Another control variable used is the economic growth of a country, 
which is defined as DEVELOPED and measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
firms operate in a developed country and 0 if firms operate in a developing country. Wei and 
Wang (2016) find that firms domiciled in developed countries disclose more environmental 
information. Finally, year effects (YEAR) are also controlled, including a set of dummy 
variables. In Table 5, we offer a summary of all the variables employed in this research.  
Insert Table 5 
4.3. Methodology 
 To test our hypotheses, we run the following model:  
ENVIR_DISCLit = β0 + β1 POW_DISTit + β2 INDIVit + β3 MASCULit + β4 UNC_AVOIDit + β5 
LONG_ORIENTATIONit + β6 INDULGit + β7 CIVIL_LAWit + β8EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYSTit 
+ β9HIGH_IMPACT_INDUSit + β10 SIZEit + β11 ROAit + β12 LEVERAGEit + β13 B_SIZEit + 
β14 B_INDEPit + β15 CSR_COMMITTEEit + β16 ASIAit + β17 EUROPEit + β18 
LATINAMERICAit + β19 NORTHAMERICAit + β20 DEVELOPEDit + ∑ βj YEARt + Ʊi  + ϴit  
 
Where: 
The subscript “i” represents the firm, “t” refers to the time period, β is the estimated 
parameter, Ʊi represents the unobservable time-invariant, firm-specific effects (the 
unobservable heterogeneity) variable among individuals and constant over time (Greene, 1988), 
and ϴit is the disturbance term that varies the cross-time and cross-section joint effect. Firm-
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specific effects are taken into account in order to control for firm-particular effects on our 
dependent variable.  
The model is estimated using the dynamic panel data estimator of the generalised 
method of moments (GMM) (Arellano & Bond, 1991, 1998), which lags the dependent variable 
(introducing the temporal dependency). Contrary to other estimators, the GMM procedure is 
consistent and efficient because it considers the unobservable heterogeneity (Ʊi) by modelling 
it as an individual effect and by removing it with the first differences of the variables. 
Additionally, the GMM procedure also takes into account endogeneity and reduces the 
estimation bias.  
The GMM procedure presents the Wald χ2 test, the Arellano–Bond tests AR(1) and 
AR(2), and the Hansen test. The Wald χ2 test shows us the model fitness. Whether a second-
order serial correlation in the first difference residuals exists is shown by the Arellano–Bond 
test AR(2). The null hypothesis posits “no serial correlation”, showing its rejection (p>0.1) that 
there is no second-order serial correlation. Additionally, the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions confirms the suitability of the instruments used in the estimation if the null 
hypothesis of non-correlation between the instruments and the error term is rejected (p>0.1).  
 
5. Analysis of results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
 In Table 6, we provide the most important statistics of all the variables used in this 
research study. Our dependent variable, environmental disclosure index (ENVIR_DISCL), 
shows, on average, a value of 0.24. Thus, the international firms of our sample report 
information on nearly 24% of the 53 environmental items considered in our research to 
construct the environmental disclosure index. Focusing on the six cultural dimensions, the 
power distance (POW_DIST) is 45.17 out of 100, individualism (INDIV) is 72.36 out of 100, 
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masculinity (MASCUL) is 61.46 out of 100, uncertainty avoidance (UNC_AVOID) is 56.63 
out of 100, long-term orientation (LONG_ORIENTATION) is 48.11, and indulgence 
(INDULG) is 59.55. Furthermore, 42.18% of the firms of our sample operate in a country with 
civil law (CIVIL_LAW) and the efficiency of the judicial system (EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST) 
is, on average, 9.37 out of 10, showing that the efficiency of the judicial systems is high. A total 
of 61.25% of the firms of the sample operate in high-impact industries. Firm size is 9.64 (log 
of total assets, expressed in euros), the return on assets (ROA) is 6.38%, the leverage, on 
average, is 13.11%, the number of board members is 10.89, 50.79% of the board members are 
independent, and 59.08% of the firms have a CSR committee. Additionally, 19.80% of the 
countries in our sample are located in Asia, 32.06% in Europe, 2.88% in Latin America, 38.44% 
in North America and 6.82% in Oceania, while 91.37% of the countries operate in developed 
countries.  
In Table 6, the Shapiro–Francia W test for normality is also provided for each variable. 
The null-hypothesis of this test is that the population is normally distributed (Azat, 2014). Thus, 
on the one hand, if the p-value is less than the chosen alpha level, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected and there is evidence that the data tested are not normally distributed. On the other 
hand, if the p-value is greater than the chosen alpha level, then the null hypothesis that the data 
came from a normally distributed population cannot be rejected. For all the values of the 
Shapiro–Francia W test, the p-value is >0.1, and accordingly, for all the variables, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of normality and we can confirm that our data are normally 
distributed.  
Insert Table 6 
In addition, multicollinearity concerns have been checked by calculating the correlation 
matrix provided in Table 7. According to the values of Table 7, none of the coefficients is higher 
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than 0.8 (e.g., Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms, & Olcina-Sempere, 2016). Therefore, 
multicollinearity is not a problem in our analysis.  
Insert Table 7 
5.2. Multivariate analysis and discussion  
 In Table 8, we present the findings of the nine models built for testing our hypotheses. 
In Model 1, we explore the association between the cultural dimensions of power distance 
(POW_DIST) and environmental disclosure. The variable of power distance provides a 
negative sign, according to our expectations, but it is not statistically significant. Thus, our first 
hypothesis is not supported and this finding suggests that power distance does not have an effect 
on the reporting of environmental information. Our evidence shows that the level of hierarchy 
in a society is not a determinant factor affecting the disclosure of environmental matters. In 
other words, a higher or lower power distance in the national culture of each country does not 
influence the decision-making process of firms regarding corporate environmental reporting. 
This is in contrast to Waldman et al. (2006) and Peng, Dashdeleg, and Chih (2014), who find 
that managers operating in firms located in countries with a stronger power distance will tend 
to disclose less environmental information because this cultural dimension induces them to 
show less commitment to stakeholders’ needs, and to Ho, Wang, and Vitell (2012) and Ioannou 
and Serafeim (2012), who support the thesis that a stronger power distance is positively 
associated with environmental reporting. It was expected a lower environmental disclosure in 
societies with a large power distance because in these societies there will be more income 
inequality, more violence in national politics, political systems change by revolution, middle 
class is smaller, dictatorships are more normal, business executives tend to be older, superiors 
are superior beings and subordinates expect to be told. In this case, the less powerful members 
of institutions and organisations will expect and accept that power is distributed unequally and 
companies tend to adopt corporate behaviors, which are not engaged with stakeholders’ needs. 
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A high-power distance value would be more likely to reduce the dialogue between the 
management team and employees, and to mitigate the consumer pressure on businesses with 
regard to environmental-related issues such as environmental disclosure. This assumption is 
supported by Waldman et al. (2006), who suggest that societies with stronger power distance 
values encourage corporations’ managers to show little concern for stakeholders and firms do 
not need to issue more information about environmental matters to achieve the benefits of 
stakeholders. This would let us expect a negative relationship between a high-power distance 
and environmental reporting, in contrast to what our evidence has shown.  
Insert Table 8 
 In Models 2, 3 and 6, the effects of individualism (INDIV), masculinity (MASCUL) 
and indulgence (INDULG), respectively, on environmental disclosure are examined. All 
variables (INDIV, MASCUL and INDULG) provide a negative sign, as predicted, and are 
statistically significant. Therefore, hypotheses 2, 3 and 6 cannot be rejected. These results 
confirm that the cultural dimensions of individualism, masculinity and indulgence negatively 
affect the reporting of environmental information. According to Ho et al. (2012), communities 
in which individualism prevails place importance on independence and freedom and 
consequently, this individualism incites people to prioritise individual needs and interests rather 
than collective demands. This may explain why firms operating in individualist cultures will be 
less likely to report environmental information, because the sensitivity of the firms’ managers 
towards stakeholders’ needs will be lower. According to Akaah (1990), in individualistic 
cultures, workers show behaviours less ethics than those of collectivist cultures. In this regard, 
collectivist countries will tend to show more concerns about the effect of business activities on 
society (Ho et al., 2012, p. 425) and more sensitivity toward stakeholders’ needs (Blodgett, Lu, 
Rose, & Vitell, 2001). This supports the thesis that collectivist cultures will be more likely to 
disclose environmental information than individualistic cultures, as Garcia-Sanchez, Cuadrado-
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Ballesteros, and Frias-Aceituno (2016) suggest by providing evidence that firms from 
collectivistic contexts will have more incentives to report environmental and social information 
to their stakeholders because it will improve their decision-making process. Additionally, it 
seems that communities where masculinity predominates are less inclined to provide resources, 
such as environmental information, to their stakeholders. The findings suggest that masculine 
cultures in our sample show a lower stakeholder orientation, in line with past literature (Peng 
& Lin, 2009; Roy & Goll, 2014). In masculine communities, where work prevails over family, 
religion focuses on powerful God, the strongest is admired, the weakest is disdained, fathers 
should deal with facts and mothers with feelings, and emotional gender roles are distinct: men 
should be assertive, tough and focused on material success, while women on the quality of life, 
companies decrease the disclosure of environmental information. In this regard, co-operation, 
integration, cohesion, agreement, fewer functional illiterates, fewer people living in poverty, 
both genders shop for food and more aid to poorer countries, among others, are not predominant 
values among companies’ managers. These values would be more expected to prevail in 
feminine contexts and, consequently, would be associated with a higher disclosure of 
environmental information. Furthermore, indulgent cultures also tend to report less 
environmental information, because these communities support desires such as enjoying life or 
entertainment more than restraint cultures (Ismail & Lu, 2014). Members in indulgent 
communities will also feel healthier and happier, have a perception of personal life control, 
their attitude is positive and optimist, freedom of speech for all is rated as very important and 
moral discipline and ethic will be lower, inter alia. These feelings are less conducive to the 
disclosure of environmental information, particularly because indulgent communities are not 
related to ethical and moral discipline, and they will be not expected to be more transparent and 
to require extensive disclosure than restraint societies, where moral discipline and ethics are 
stricter, societies suppress gratification of needs and regulate it by means of strict social norms, 
34 
maintaining order in the nation is rated as very important and personalities are more introverted 
and pessimistic. Indulgent cultures will have less incentives to satisfy stakeholders’ needs and 
demands through environmental practices, given the features that characterise them.  
 In Model 4, we analyse the impact of uncertainty avoidance (UNC_AVOID) on 
environmental disclosure. The coefficient of the variable is positive, in contrast to our 
predictions, and is significant from a statistical point of view. According to this finding, 
hypothesis 4 cannot be supported. Thus, strong uncertainty avoidance cultures have a positive 
impact on the reporting of environmental information. Moreover, it also seems that the strict 
codes of behaviour and beliefs predominant in uncertainty avoidance communities, as well as 
the major presence of norms and rules imposed on individuals and the intolerance to unorthodox 
ideas and behavior, encourage managers to disclose environmental information. This suggests 
that more environmentally proactive companies establish norms to ensure certainty and 
stability. In this regard, Kim & Kim (2009, p. 497) consider that “CSR-related activities seem 
to be interpreted by public relations practitioners as one means to guarantee the success of both 
the organization and society at the same time”. Our evidence is not in line with most of past 
research on the topic, which shows that strong uncertainty avoidance may result in a weak 
commitment of companies to sustainability issues such as environmental disclosure (Vachon, 
2010; Cordeiro & Sarkis, 1997). It would be expected a higher disclosure of environmental 
information in weak uncertainty avoidance societies because they maintain a more relaxed 
attitude in which practice counts more than principles (Nakata & Sivakumar, 1996) and 
companies’ stakeholders often require corporate sustainability practices, such as environmental 
reporting.  
 In Model 5, we explore the relationship between the long-term orientation culture 
dimension (LONG_ORIENTATION) and the reporting of environmental information. The 
variable exhibits a negative sign, contrary to our predictions, and is statistically significant. 
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Thus, the fifth hypothesis cannot be accepted and we conclude that communities that show a 
long-term orientation are less inclined to disclose information related to environmental issues. 
Although sustainability and environmental issues show their benefits in the long term, our 
evidence seems to suggest that communities with a long-term orientation tend to report less 
environmental information. A lower environmental reporting would be more likely in short-
term orientation cultures, where virtues related to the past and the present, such as national 
pride, respect for tradition, and fulfilling social obligation are fostered. Furthermore, firms 
stress bottom line and report quarterly results, investors prefer mutual funds and shares and 
there is little money for investment and small savings quotes, inter alia. Our findings are 
contrary to the views of Hofstede (2001), who supports that long-term oriented societies will 
stand for fostering the pragmatic virtues oriented to future rewards, in particular perseverance, 
will stand for adapting to changing circumstances, firms will seek long-term profits, there will 
be funds available for investment and large savings quotes and investors will prefer family 
business and real estate, which would be more consistent with a higher environmental 
disclosure, due to its long-term benefits. Our results are also opposing to the literature on 
managers’ temporal orientation, which would suggest that long-term oriented societies would 
emphisise long term outcomes and priorities such as benefits or performances derivited from 
the disclosure of environmental matters. Thus, our evidence may imply a lower engagement of 
long-term orientation cultures with environmental matters.  
Concerning the control variables, the findings show that countries with civil law tend to 
disclose less environmental information when individualism and uncertainty avoidance are 
explored and more environmental information when the long-term orientation cultural 
dimension is analysed. Furthermore, in all models, except for Model 1, where the power 
distance is explored, a higher efficiency of the judicial system and a higher board size will result 
in a higher reporting of environmental matters. Firm size is positively associated to 
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environmental information only when uncertainty avoidance is analysed. Additionally, more 
independent board members positively affect environmental information disclosure when the 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance cultural dimensions are taken into account, and the 
presence of a CSR committee in a company has a positive effect on the reporting of 
environmental information in all models, except in Model 1 (power distance) and Model 4 
(uncertainty avoidance), where the signs are not statistically significant. The variable of 
developed countries follows the same pattern as the variable of a CSR committee, but it 
negatively affects environmental disclosure. Moreover, countries domiciled in Asia show a 
negative impact on environmental information when the individualism and indulgence cultural 
dimensions are considered. Countries in Latin America show a negative effect on 
environmental information not only when the individualism and indulgence dimensions are 
explored, but also when uncertainty avoidance is considered. Countries in North America only 
show a negative impact on the disclosure of environmental information when indulgence is 
analysed. Companies operating in European countries show a positive effect on environmental 
information disclosure when we take into account the individualism, masculinity and long-term 
orientation cultural dimensions. The remaining control variables are insignificant. In Table 9, 
we provide a summary of the expected and obtained signs for each of the hypotheses.  
Insert Table 9 
5.3. Robustness analysis 
 An analysis of robustness was conducted to corroborate our results. In this regard, we 
used as a dependent variable the unweighted aggregation of the 53 items of environmental 
issues considered for measuring our environmental disclosure index (ENVIR_DISCL). This 
variable varies from 0 to 53. So as not to extend the paper more than necessary, the results of 
the regressions are not shown here, but they confirm the evidence shown in our baseline models. 
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Therefore, the impact of the cultural dimensions on environmental disclosure is independent of 
the way of measuring the dependent variable.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 Drawing on the diversity of cultures across countries, specifically the Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions, the aim of this paper is to explore the effect of the culture context where 
firms operate on their environmental disclosure practices. As proxies of the cultural context, 
we use Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions (normative isomorphism): (1) power distance, (2) 
individualism, (3) masculinity, (4) uncertainty avoidance, (5) long-term orientation, and (6) 
indulgence.  
The findings show that three of Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions—individualism, 
masculinity and indulgence—do indeed have an impact on environmental disclosure, while 
power distance is not significant, and uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation are 
positive and negatively associated with the reporting of environmental information, contrary to 
our predictions. Individualism, masculinity and indulgence have a negative effect on 
environmental information.  
Several implications can be derived from this analysis. First, our evidence confirms the 
diversity of cultures across countries perspective on the reporting of environmental information. 
Further research could seek to shed some light on the impact of this aspect of the culture 
approach on other business decisions, such as CSR disclosure or firm performance. This 
evidence may reinforce the theoretical foundations that argue which factors incentivise firms to 
disclose environmental issues. Second, our findings provide a solid understanding of which 
cultural contexts, measured with Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions, encourage the reporting 
of environmental information, and which may be useful for regulatory bodies. Countries with 
individualist, masculine and indulgent cultures are not the most suitable contexts for disclosing 
38 
environmental issues. Contrary to our predictions, long-term orientation cultures also 
discourage the reporting of environmental information, while uncertainty avoidance contexts 
tend to encourage the reporting of environmental matters. Thus, international policymakers 
might take into account this evidence and recommend or enforce certain aspects over which 
they may have some influence, such as certain cultural dimensions. At the same time, our 
evidence can also be very useful for bringing about the regulatory homogenisation of 
environmental disclosure practices with a view to harmonisation by the European Union or the 
United Nations. Third, managers of companies may consider our findings of great interest, and 
they should pay attention to the disclosure practices on environmental issues in relation to the 
demands of stakeholders. The stakeholders’ expectations should be exceeded by companies 
and, for this reason, firms should adopt policies and make decisions which are beneficial for 
society, where culture is a key determinant. In this regard, managers should learn to address 
cultural differences by implementing proper practices in the cultural context in which they 
operate and, therefore, they should deeply know the culture of the country. Our findings provide 
relevant evidence for managers who are looking into enter new markets with the knowledge 
needed to learn more about the cultural aspects, and who are expecting to be successful in 
international business. Furthermore, the results of this research may also be relevant for 
stakeholders, given that they will have more knowledge regarding in which institutional 
contexts companies are more likely to report environmental information. Finally, our evidence 
may be useful for other researchers, since this paper offers partial empirical support for the 
diversity of cultures across countries approach at the international level in terms of how 
Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions affect environmental disclosure. Our findings disprove some 
of the main results of past research, which also focuses on the Hofstede’s culture dimensions. 
Specifically, contratry to prior empirical evidence, the power distance does not impact 
environmental disclosure, while uncertainity avoidance affects positively it and long-term 
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orientation negatively. This contradicting evidence signals the need for additional empirical 
reseach to better understand the suggested relationship between national cultures and 
environmental reporting. We hope future researchers can benefit from our findings and we 
encourage them to extend our research and to build on these insights.  
Some future lines of research can be derived from our investigation. We encourage other 
scholars to extend our research to a sample of companies in both developed and developing 
countries. It would also be interesting to explore the effects of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
or other voluntary disclosures using a sample of financial entities.  
Notes 
1 The cultural insights website of Geert Hofstede can be accessed at: https://www.geert-hofstede.com/ 
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Table 1 
Number of observations by country 
Country  Observations Percentage Cum. 
Australia 817 6.40% 6.40% 
Austria 41 0.32% 6.72% 
Belgium 97 0.76% 7.48% 
Brazil 257 2.01% 9.50% 
Canada 1,155 9.05% 18.55% 
Chile 110 0.86% 19.41% 
China 342 2.68% 22.09% 
Denmark 115 0.90% 23.00% 
Finland 142 1.11% 24.11% 
France 578 4.53% 28.64% 
Germany 407 3.19% 31.83% 
Greece 10 0.08% 31.91% 
Hong Kong 128 1.00% 32.91% 
India 171 1.34% 34.25% 
Ireland 175 1.37% 35.62% 
Italy 133 1.04% 36.66% 
Japan 1,789 14.02% 50.69% 
Mexico 124 0.97% 51.66% 
Netherlands 220 1.72% 53.38% 
New Zealand 53 0.42% 53.80% 
Norway 70 0.55% 54.35% 
Portugal 29 0.23% 54.57% 
Spain 211 1.65% 56.23% 
Sweden 261 2.05% 58.27% 
Switzerland 393 3.08% 61.35% 
Thailand 97 0.76% 62.11% 
United Kingdom 1,209 9.48% 71.59% 
United States  3,625 28.41% 100% 
Total  12,759 100%  
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Table 2 
Number of firms and observations by activity sector 
 
TRBC economic sector name Number of 
firms 
Number of 
observations 
Percentage of 
observations 
Cum. of 
observations 
Basic Materials 203 1,753 13.74% 13.74% 
Consumer Cyclicals 283 2,454 19.23% 32.97% 
Consumer Non-cyclicals 157 1,279 10.02% 43.00% 
Energy 148 1,193 9.35% 52.35% 
Healthcare 124 1,012 7.93% 60.28% 
Industrials 324 2,795 21.91% 82.19% 
Technology 130 1,017 7.97% 90.16% 
Telecommunications services 55 460 3.61% 93.76% 
Utilities 82 796 6.24% 100% 
Total 1,506 12,759 100%  
 
Table 3 
Environmental disclosure items 
Resource use Emissions Innovation 
Resource reduction policy 
 
Policy emissions Environmental products 
Water efficiency policy Targets emissions Eco-design products 
 
Energy efficiency policy 
 
Biodiversity impact reduction 
 
Noise reduction 
 
Sustainable packaging policy 
 
Emissions trading 
 
Hybrid vehicles 
 
Environment supply chain 
policy 
 
Climate change commercial risk 
opportunities 
Environmental assets under MGT 
 
Resource reduction targets 
 
NOx and SOx emissions 
reduction 
Equator principles 
 
Environment management team 
 
VOC or particulate matter 
emissions 
 
 
Equator principles or 
environmental projects 
Environment management 
training 
VOC emissions reduction  
Environmental project financing 
 
Environmental materials 
sourcing 
 
Particulate matter emission 
reduction 
 
Nuclear 
 
Toxic chemicals reduction 
 
Waste reduction total 
 
Labelled wood 
 
 
Renewable energy use 
e-Waste reduction Organic products initiatives 
 
Green buildings 
Environmental restoration 
initiatives 
Product impact minimisation 
 
Environmental supply chain 
management 
 
Staff transportation impact 
reduction 
 
Take-back and recycling 
initiatives 
 
Environmental supply chain 
monitoring 
 
Environmental expenditures 
investment 
 
Responsible use of environmental 
products 
 
Environmental supply chain 
partnership termination 
  
GMO products 
  Agrochemical products 
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Table 4 
High- and low-impact industries 
 
Economic sector 
Young and 
Marais (2012) 
model 
FTSE4Good 
Indexes (2015) 
model 
Semenova and 
Hassel (2016) 
model 
Jaggi, Allini, 
Macchioni, 
and Zagaria 
(2018) model 
Financials Low Low Low Low 
Industrials High High High High 
Utilities High High High High 
Cyclical consumer goods and 
services 
Low Low Low Low 
Healthcare Low Low Low Low 
Non-cyclical consumer goods and 
services 
High High High High 
Technology Low Low Low Low 
Basic materials High High High High 
Energy High High High High 
Telecommunication services Low Low Low Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Land environmental impact 
reduction 
 
 
 Agrochemical 5% revenue 
  Animal testing in the last 12fy 
  
 
Animal testing cosmetics 
  
 
Animal testing reduction 
  
 
Renewable clean energy products 
 
  
Water technologies 
  
 
Sustainable building products 
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Table 5 
Variables description 
 
 
Table 6 
Descriptive analysis 
 
Variables Description 
ENVIR_DISCL The ratio between the aggregation of 53 items focused on environmental issues and the 
total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each 
item, it will take the value 1, and 0 otherwise 
POW_DIST Power distance is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010) and 
ranges from 0 to 100 
INDIV Individualism is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010) and 
ranges from 0 to 100 
MASCUL Masculinity is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010) and ranges 
from 0 to 100 
UNC_AVOID Uncertainty avoidance is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010) 
and ranges from 0 to 100 
LONG_ORIENTATION Long-term orientation is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010) 
and ranges from 0 to 100 
INDULG Indulgence is one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010) and ranges 
from 0 to 100 
CIVIL_LAW Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in a country with civil 
law, and 0 otherwise  
EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST This variable measures the efficiency of the judicial system of a country and ranges from 
0 to 10 
HIGH_IMPACT_INDUS Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in an industry with strong 
and direct environmental impact, and 0 otherwise   
SIZE The log of total assets 
ROA Operating income before interests and taxes over total assets 
LEVERAGE Debt over total assets 
B_SIZE Number of directors on board 
B_INDEP Proportion of independent directors on boards = Total number of independent directors 
on boards / Total number of directors on boards 
CSR_COMMITTEE Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee, and 0 
otherwise 
ASIA Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is in Asia; 0 = Otherwise 
EUROPE Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is in Europe; 0 = Otherwise 
LATINAMERICA Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is in Latin America; 0 = Otherwise 
NORTHAMERICA Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is in North America; 0 = Otherwise 
OCEANIA Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is in Oceania; 0 = Otherwise 
DEVELOPED Dummy variable: 1 = If the country is developed; 0 = If the country is developing 
Variable Obs. 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Shapiro–
Francia W 
test 
ENVIR_DISCL 12,759 0.24 0.17 0.94 
POW_DIST 12,759 45.17 13.32 0.82 
INDIV 12,759 72.36 21.29 0.86 
MASCUL 12,759 61.46 19.24 0.87 
UNC_AVOID 12,759 56.63 20.58 0.84 
LONG_ORIENTATION 12,759 48.11 24.07 0.84 
INDULG 12,759 59.55 14.80 0.82 
CIVIL_LAW 12,759 42.18 49.38 0.62 
EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST 12,759 9.37 1.24 0.63 
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Mean, standard deviation and the Shapiro–Francia W test for normality. ENVIR_DISCL is the ratio between the aggregation of 53 items 
focused on environmental issues and the total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each item, it will 
take the value 1, and 0 otherwise; POW_DIST represents the power distance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), 
and ranges from 0 to 100; INDIV represents individualism, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 
0 to 100; MASCUL represents masculinity, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; 
UNC_AVOID represents uncertainty avoidance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; 
LONG_ORIENTATION represents long-term orientation, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 
to 100; INDULG represents indulgence, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; 
CIVIL_LAW is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in a country with civil law, and 0 otherwise; 
EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST measures the efficiency of the judicial system of a country and ranges from 0 to 10; HIGH_IMPACT_INDUS is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in an industry with strong and direct environmental impact, and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE is the log of total assets; ROA is the operating income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEVERAGE is the debt over total 
assets; B_SIZE is the number of directors on a board; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards = Total number of 
independent directors on boards/ Total number of directors on boards; CSR_COMMITTEE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company has a CSR committee, and 0 otherwise; ASIA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is in Asia, and 0 otherwise; 
EUROPE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is in Europe, and 0 otherwise; LATINAMERICA is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the country is in Latin America, and 0 otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
country is in North America, and 0 otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is in Oceania, and 0 
otherwise; DEVELOPED is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is a developed country, and 0 if the country is a developing 
country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIGH_IMPACT_INDUS 12,759 61.25 48.72 0.64 
SIZE 12,759 9.64 1.48 0.50 
ROA 12,759 6.38 8.45 0.72 
LEVERAGE 12,759 13.11 22.06 0.00 
B_SIZE 12,759 10.89 3.58 0.89 
B_INDEP 12,759 50.79 34.84 0.88 
CSR_COMMITTEE 12,759 59.08 49.17 0.65 
ASIA 12,759 19.80 39.86 0.46 
EUROPE 12,759 32.06 46.67 0.58 
LATINAMERICA 12,759 2.88 16.71 0.11 
NORTHAMERICA 12,759 38.44 48.65 0.62 
OCEANIA 12,759 6.82 25.21 0.23 
DEVELOPED 12,759 91.37 28.08 0.34 
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Table 7 
Correlation matrix 
 
ENVIR_DISCL is the ratio between the aggregation of 53 items focused on environmental issues and the total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each item, it will take the value 
1, and 0 otherwise; POW_DIST represents the power distance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; INDIV represents individualism, one of the six culture dimensions 
addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; MASCUL represents masculinity, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; UNC_AVOID represents uncertainty 
avoidance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; LONG_ORIENTATION represents long-term orientation, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede 
(2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; INDULG represents indulgence, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; CIVIL_LAW is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the company operates in a country with civil law, and 0 otherwise; EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST measures the efficiency of the judicial system of a country and ranges from 0 to 10; HIGH_IMPACT_INDUS is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in an industry with a strong and direct environmental impact, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the log of total assets; ROA is the operating income before interests and taxes 
over total assets; LEVERAGE is the debt over total assets; B_SIZE is the number of directors on a board; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards = Total number of independent directors on boards 
/ Total number of directors on boards; CSR_COMMITTEE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee, and 0 otherwise; ASIA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country 
is in Asia, and 0 otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is in Europe, and 0 otherwise; LATINAMERICA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is in Latin America, 
and 0 otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is in North America, and 0 otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is in Oceania, and 
0 otherwise; DEVELOPED is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is a developed country and 0 if the country is a developing country. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
ENVIR_DISCL (1) 1.1.00                      
POW_DIST (2) −0 0.06*** 1.00                     
INDIV (3) −0.15*** −0.35**
* 
1.00                    
MASCUL (4) 0.09*** 0.06*** −0.18**
* 
1.00                   
UNC_AVOID (5) 0.15*** 0.39*** −0.51**
* 
0.14*** 1.00                  
LONG_ORIENTATION (6) 0.23*** 0.24*** −0.74**
* 
0.40*** 043*** 1.00                 
INDULG (7) −0.02*** −0.62**
* 
0.57*** −0.35**
* 
−0.46**
* 
−0.59**
* 
1.00                
EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST (8) 0.01 −0.36**
* 
0.49*** 0.33*** −0.21**
* 
−0.15**
* 
0.32*** 1.00               
CIVIL_LAW (9) 0.22*** 0.31*** −0.78**
* 
0.16*** 0.63*** 0.74*** −0.58**
* 
−0.29**
* 
1.00              
HIGH_IMPACT_INDUS (10) 0.08*** 0.04*** −0.12**
* 
−0.04**
* 
0.05*** 0.05*** −0.01 −0.13**
* 
0.04*** 1.000             
SIZE (11) 0.51*** 0.22*** −0.06**
* 
0.12*** 0.07*** 0.16*** −0.29**
* 
−0.04**
* 
−0.18**
* 
0.10*** 1.00            
ROA (12) −0.13*** −0.10**
* 
0.17*** −0.11**
* 
−0.27**
* 
−0.21**
* 
0.15*** 0.05*** −0.19**
* 
−0.13**
* 
−0.20**
* 
1.000           
LEVERAGE (13) 0.14*** 0.07*** −0.06**
* 
0.02* 0.06*** 0.08*** −0.08**
* 
−0.08**
* 
0.09*** 0.16*** 0.29*** −0.37**
* 
1.00          
B_SIZE (14) 0.32*** 0.24*** −0.11**
* 
0.07*** 0.06*** 0.15*** −0.28**
* 
−0.20**
* 
0.13*** 0.07*** 0.51*** −0.09**
* 
0.18*** 1.00         
B_INDEP (15) −0.08*** −0.23**
* 
0.63*** −0.27**
* 
−0.37**
* 
−0.56**
* 
0.39*** 0.20*** −0.54**
* 
−0.03**
* 
−0.01 0.15*** −0.04**
* 
−0.13**
* 
        
CSR_COMMITTEE (16) 0.62*** 0.00 −0.07**
* 
0.034**
* 
0.07*** 0.12*** −0.00 0.00 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.30*** −0.13**
* 
0.10*** 0.19*** −0.01 1.00      
ASIA (17) 0.10*** 0.55*** −0.64**
* 
0.51*** 0.35*** 0.63*** −0.64**
* 
0.03*** 0.42*** 0.04*** 0.11*** −0.17**
* 
0.02** 0.10*** −0.47**
* 
0.06*** 1.00     
EUROPE (18) 0.20*** −0.45**
* 
−0.18**
* 
−0.08**
* 
−0.08**
* 
0.34*** 0.05*** −0.16**
* 
0.33*** −0.01**
* 
0.05*** 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.07*** −0.18**
* 
0.08*** −0.34**
* 
1.00    
LATINAMERICA (19) 0.02* 0.25*** −0.26**
* 
−0.23**
* 
0.17*** −0.01**
* 
−0.09**
* 
−0.33**
* 
0.20*** 0.09*** 0.02* 0.002 0.05*** −0.06**
* 
−0.15**
* 
−0.00 −0.09**
* 
−0.12**
* 
1.00   
NORTHAMERICA (20) −0.21*** −0.02* 0.71*** −0.18**
* 
−0.32**
* 
−0.62**
* 
0.29*** 0.15*** −0.63**
* 
−0.05**
* 
−0.02* 0.11*** −0.07**
* 
−0.02**
* 
0.58*** −0.09**
* 
−0.39**
* 
−0.54**
* 
−0.14**
* 
1.00  
OCEANIA (21)  −0.14*** −0.24**
* 
0.16*** −0.17**
* 
0.10*** −0.42**
* 
0.41*** 0.18*** −0.20**
* 
0.00 −0.24**
* 
0.01*** −0.05**
* 
−0.28**
* 
0.05*** −0.04**
* 
−0.13**
* 
−0.19**
* 
−0.05**
* 
−0.21**
* 
1.00 
DEVELOPED (22) 0.04*** −0.48**
* 
0.46*** 0.10*** 0.05*** −0.05**
* 
0.25*** 0.57*** −0.21**
* 
−0.10**
* 
−0.05**
* 
−0.09**
* 
−0.02* −0.07**
* 
0.21*** 0.04*** −0.27**
* 
0.21*** −0.56**
* 
0.17*** 0.08*** 
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Table 8 
Multivariate analysis results of the Generalised Method of Moments 
 
 MODEL 1 
Coef. 
P>|t| 
MODEL 2 
Coef. 
P>|t| 
MODEL 3 
Coef. 
P>|t| 
MODEL 4 
Coef. 
P>|t| 
MODEL 5 
Coef. 
P>|t| 
MODEL 6 
Coef. 
P>|t| 
ENVIR_DISCL(t−1) 1.493** 
(0.024) 
−0.041 
(0.387) 
−0.037 
(0.368) 
−0.014 
(0.763) 
−0.066 
(0.182) 
−0.000 
(0.999) 
POW_DIST −0.007 
(0.951) 
     
INDIV  −0.094*** (0.003)  
   
MASCUL   −0.031*** (0.004) 
   
UNC_AVOID    0.033*** (0.001) 
  
LONG_ORIENTATION     −0.046***  (0.003) 
 
INDULG      −0.043** (0.034) 
CIVIL_LAW 1.393 
(0.208) 
−1.217** 
(0.027) 
0.117  
(0.637) 
−0.887**  
(0.024) 
1.186** 
(0.011) 
0.092  
(0.712) 
EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST 0.122 
(0.761) 
1.220*** 
(0.003) 
0.766** 
(0.012) 
0.329* 
(0.079) 
0.433** 
(0.040) 
0.513** 
(0.041) 
HIGH_IMPACT_INDUS −0.159 
(0.802) 
0.054  
(0.843) 
0.023  
(0.931) 
0.127 
(0.504) 
0.086 
(0.668) 
0.102 
(0.651) 
SIZE −0.045 
(0.658) 
0.078  
(0.292) 
0.036  
(0.541) 
0.112* 
 (0.081) 
0.045 
 (0.297) 
0.051 
 (0.351) 
ROA 0.021 
(0.309) 
−0.002 
(0.692) 
0.001 
 (0.747) 
0.007 
 (0.221) 
0.001 
 (0.906) 
−0.003 
 (0.593) 
LEVERAGE 0.000 
(0.823) 
0.000 
(0.770) 
0.000 
(0.635) 
0.000 
(0.868) 
−0.000 
(0.798) 
0.000 
(0.483) 
B_SIZE 0.099 
(0.116) 
0.029*  
(0.078) 
0.034**  
(0.039) 
0.057***  
(0.006) 
0.067***  
(0.004)* 
0.052***  
(0.003) 
B_INDEP 0.008 
(0.194) 
0.001 
(0.430) 
0.001* 
(0.083) 
0.002** 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.071) 
0.002 
(0.200) 
CSR_COMMITTEE 0.044 
(0.648) 
0.143*** 
(0.003) 
0.123*** 
(0.002) 
0.123 
(0.978) 
0.090*** 
(0.009) 
0.115*** 
(0.006) 
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ASIA −4.874 
(0.223) 
−3.966*** 
(0.002) 
0.065  
(0.896) 
−0.685  
(0.147) 
1.262 
(0.109) 
−2.253**  
(0.016) 
EUROPE −4.115 
(0.161) 
1.122** 
(0.024) 
0.756** 
(0.045) 
0.654 
(0.176) 
1.029** 
(0.034) 
−0.323 
 (0.505) 
LATINAMERICA −2.895 
(0.390) 
−2.649* 
(0.059) 
−0.655 
(0.612) 
−2.179** 
(0.015) 
0.183 
(0.863) 
−1.746* 
(0.062) 
NORTHAMERICA −3.383 
(0.309) 
−0.499 
(0.191) 
−0.295 
 (0.396) 
−0.338 
 (0.187) 
−0.166 
 (0.573) 
−0.707**  
(0.032) 
DEVELOPED −0.645 
(0.805) 
−2.640** 
(0.018) 
−2.478** 
(0.020) 
−2.405*** 
(0.008) 
−0.919 
(0.298) 
−2.088** 
 (0.014) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald χ2 test 306.52*** 564.20*** 925.30*** 542.35*** 440.61*** 599.80*** 
Arellano−–Bond test AR(1) (z, p>|z|) −1.40 (0.161) −1.19 (0.234) −1.08 (0.282) −1.99 (0.046) −1.55 (0.120) 5.47 (0.987) 
Arellano−–Bond test AR(2) (z, p>|z|) −0.20 (0.843) −0.67 (0.505) −0.07 (0.943) 0.32 (0.751) −0.11 (0.916) 24.21 (0.007) 
Hansen test (chi−square, p>|chi2|) 2.01 (0.570) 16.24(0.908) 19.66 (0.765) 30.18 (0.218) 21.43(0.065) 25.37 (0.021) 
 
 
ENVIR_DISCL is the ratio between the aggregation of 53 items focused on environmental issues and the total number of items analysed. If the company discloses information concerning each item, it will take the value 
1, and 0 otherwise; POW_DIST represents the power distance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; INDIV represents individualism, one of the six culture dimensions 
addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; MASCUL represents masculinity, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; UNC_AVOID represents uncertainty 
avoidance, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; LONG_ORIENTATION represents the long-term orientation, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede 
(2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; INDULG represents indulgence, one of the six culture dimensions addressed by Hofstede (2010), and ranges from 0 to 100; CIVIL_LAW is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the company operates in a country with civil law country, and 0 otherwise; EFFICIEN_JUDIC_SYST measures the efficiency of the judicial system of a country and ranges from 0 to 10; HIGH_IMPACT_INDUS is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in an industry with a strong and direct environmental impact, and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the log of total assets; ROA is the operating income before interests 
and taxes over total assets; LEVERAGE is the debt over total assets; B_SIZE is the number of directors on board; B_INDEP is the proportion of independent directors on boards = Total number of independent directors 
on boards / Total number of directors on boards; CSR_COMMITTEE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company has a CSR committee, and 0 otherwise; ASIA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if the country is in Asia, and 0 otherwise; EUROPE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is in Europe, and 0 otherwise; LATINAMERICA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is 
in Latin America and 0, otherwise; NORTHAMERICA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is in North America, and 0 otherwise; OCEANIA is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country 
is in Oceania, and 0 otherwise; DEVELOPED is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country is a developed country and 0 if the country is a developing country. *p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. 
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Table 9 
Expected and obtained signs for each one of the hypotheses 
Cultural variables Hypotheses Expected signs 
 
Obtained signs 
 
POW_DIST  H1 Negative Not significant 
INDIV H2 Negative Negative 
MASCUL  H3 Negative Negative 
UNC_AVOID  H4 Negative Positive 
LONG_ORIENTATION  H5 Positive Negative 
INDULG  H6 Negative Negative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
